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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE ZEESE and E M I L Y
ZEESE, his wife,
Plaintms.AvpeiianU}
E S T A T E OF MAX S I E G E L ; DAN
SIEGEL, EVA SIEGEL, and
\
W E S L E Y D. WEBB, a partnership
)
d-b-a Patton's Travelers; T R A I L E R
MART, INC., a Nevada corporation
\
d-b-a Dan's Campers N' Trailers; and
H U S K Y OIL COMPANY OF
DELAWARE, a Delaware corporation
Defendants-Respondents.

CaseNo
,qo70 '

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
GEORGE ZEESE and E M I L Y ZEESE

NATURE OF T H E CASE
This is an action in unlawful detainer brought by
the plaintiffs-appellants on the grounds that: 1) the
option to extend the lease in question was not exercised, and 2) if the option were exercised, the defend1
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ants-respondents have breached the restrictive use covenants contained therein. Plaintiffs-appellants will hereinafter be referred to as plaintiffs, and defendants-respondents will hereinafter be referred to as defendants.

DISPOSITION I N T H E L O W E R COURT
The District Court divided the trial of plaintiffs'
causes of action into 1) the issue of liability, and 2) the
issue of damages. After presentation of the facts concerning defendants' liability, the District Court entered
judgment dismissing plaintiffs' causes of action, and
denied plaintiffs' motion to amend findings and alter
judgment.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs George and Emily Zeese seek a reversal of the judgment of the District Court; an order
requiring all defendants to vacate the premises in
question; a remand to the District Court for a determination of the damages suffered by the plaintiffs; and
a dismissal of defendants' counterclaims.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 7, 1956, George and Emily Zeese
acquired as joint tenants from the Elizabeth Ann

2
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Watts Estate approximately three and one half acres
of land located at 6240 South State Street in Murray,
Utah (Executor's deed, Exhibit I P ) . Said property,
which is directly across from the Fashion Place Mall
shopping center, was subsequently conveyed to Emily
Zeese as sole owner on August 14, 1961 (Warranty
Deed, Exhibit 2 P ) .
By written lease agreement dated October 28,1959
(Exhibit 3 P ) , George and Emily Zeese leased approximately one acre of the property abutting State Street
to Saturn Oil Company, a Missouri corporation, for
the erection and operation of a gasoline and oil filling
station. Saturn Oil Company drafted the lease in question (TR. 439), which had an initial term of 10 years
commencing December 18, 1959, and included three
ten year options to extend the lease upon Lessee giving
Lessor 60 days written notice prior to the end of the
term (page 2, Tf3 of Exhibit 3 P ) . The leased premises
were to be used for no other purpose or business than
for a gasoline and oil filling station, a restaurant, a
truck stop (page 1, fl3 of Exhibit 3 P ) , or to be sublet for a gasoline and oil filling station (page 2, Tf6 of
Exhibit 3 P ) . This lease was assignable without Lessor's
consent, provided that the Lessee-assignor would not be
released from the lease obligations, but would at all
times be liable for the faithful performance of all of
the covenants of the lease (page 2, H6 of Exhibit 3 P ) .
The parties further covenanted that there would be no
waiver or any forfeiture, by acceptance of rent or
otherwise, of any subsequent cause for forfeiture, or
3

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

breach of any terms and conditions of the lease (page
4, 1F2 of Exhibit 3 P ) . I n turn, the Lessors allowed
Lessee 30 days, from receipt of notice of termination,
to remedy any breach of the terms and conditions and
reinstate the lease (page 3, 116 of Exhibit 3 P ) .
Saturn Oil Company then erected a gasoline and
oil filling station on the leased premises and operated
it until the lease was assigned (Exhibit 4P) on March
8,1965 (TR. 439) to J . L. Terborg & Company, a general partnership. J . L. Terborg & Company continued
to operate a gasoline and oil filling station on the leased
premises until the lease was quitclaimed (Exhibit 5P)
on June 1, 1968 by the Estate of M. H . Robineau,
successor to J . L. Terborg & Company, to Husky Oil
Company of Delaware (TR. 441). Husky Oil Company
of Delaware then continued to operate a gasoline and
oil filling station on the leased premises until April,
1969 (TR. 443). On May 1, 1969, without prior notice
to the Zeeses, Husky Oil Company of Delaware assigned (Exhibit 6P) the lease to Max Siegel, an individual. The applicable paragraphs of Exhibit 6 P read
as follows on next page.

4
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ASSIGNMENT OP LEASE
THIS ASSIGNMENT made this 1st day of May, 1969, between
HUSKY OIL COMPANY OP DELAWARE, a corporation, with offices at
*fO*K) East Louisiana Avenue, Denver, Colorada 80222, hereinafter
called "Assignor" and
MAX SIEGEL, an individual
with offices at 6210 S. State St.. Salt Lake City, Utah 8^107
Salt Lake City, Utah, hereinafter called "Assignee",
•••
WITNESS THE SIGNATURES OF THE Assignor and Assignee
the day and year first above written.
HUSKY OIL COMPANY OP DELAWARE
Assignor
ATTEST 1
/s/ Karl F. Armta

3y

/s/ L.H. Thompson

Karl P. Anuta,
Assistant Secretary
Assignees
Bv

/ R / ?--ax S i e g e l

STATE OF COLORADO
)
CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER ) ss.
1969t personally
On the 1st day of May
appeared before me L.M. Thompson
me duly sworn, did say that he is theV3
Oil Company of Delaware, and that said instrument was signed
on behalf of said corporation by authority of its by-laws
and said
L.M. Thompson
acknowledged to me that said
corporation executed the same.
Witness my hand and official seal.
/s/ Jeannet B. Wilson

Notary Public
My Commission expires: Sept. ?, 1969»
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF Davis

)
.) s s .

A ril
On the 2toh day of
P
, 1969» personally
appeared before me
Max Siegel
, who being by me
duly sworn, did say that he i s t t e individual
of
and that said instrument was
signed &Bx&©i«^xx$£x«c^
aaadx^eaiAc and
acknowledged
by *oc me tka&osai&**ftX|Kmati^
Witness my hand and o f f i c i a l s e a l .

/s/ Lamar Hatch

Notary Public
My Commission expirest
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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On or about May I, 1969, Max Siegel allowed
Trailer Mart, Inc. to expand its trailer and recreational sales outlet onto the Zeese property from the
contiguous Jensen property for additional display area
(TR. 549) contrary to the restrictive use covenants contained in the lease. On May 6, 1969, Husky Oil Company of Delaware apprised the Zeeses by letter (Exhibit 6P) that it had assigned the lease to Max Siegel,
an individual:
H U S K Y OIL
Company

4040 East Louisiana Ave.
Denver, Colorado 80222
Telephone 303-756-1511
May 6, 1969

Mr. George Zeese
734 South 13th East
Salt Lake City, Utah
Dear Mr. Zeese:
R e : Lease Agreement of October 28, 1959
Please refer to the Lease Agreement dated October 28, 1959, executed by you and your wife as
lessors to Saturn Oil Company, a Missouri corporation, as lessee. As you are aware, this lease was assigned on March 8, 1965 by Saturn Oil Company to
J . L. TerBorg & Co., a general partnership. By a
further conveyance dated June 1, 1968 the successor to
J . L. TerBorg & Co. assigned its interest in this property to this company. Attached for your information
is a photocopy of an assignment of this lease from this

6
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company to Mr. Max Siegel, an individual, whose address is shown thereon.
W e have directed Mr. Siegel to make all future
payments of rental under the terms of the above-referenced Lease Agreement, in the amount of $200 per
month, to your attention at the address shown in the
lease which is the address to which this letter is addressed. Mr. Siegel has assumed the entire responsibility for this property and its use and should any
questions arise we believe you should contact Mr. Siegel
directl

y-

Yours truly,
/ s / Karl F . Anuta
Karl F . Anuta, Manager
Law Department—Denver

KFA:bg
Enc.
On May 8, 1969, Max Siegel's attorney, David S.
Geldzahler, sent a letter (Exhibit 7P) along with a
copy of the assignment to notify the Zeeses that the
lease in question had been assigned to Max Siegel, and
that Trailer Mart, Inc. would be using the premises:
Law Offices of
OWEN, WARD, & GELDZAHLER
608 E l Paso Natural Gas Building
315 East Second South Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone 359-2058
May 8, 1969

7
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Mr. George Zeese
734 South 13th East
Salt Lake City, Utah
Dear Mr. Zeese:
As attorneys for Mr. Max Siegel, we herewith
wish to confirm that on May 1, 1969, Husky Oil Company assigned all of its right, title and interest in and
to that lease made by and between you and Emily
Zeese, as Lessors, with Saturn Oil Company, as Lessee,
on October 28, 1959, to Max Siegel, of 6210 South
State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. A copy of this
assignment is enclosed for your records.
Mr. Siegel has asked me to further advise you that
Trailer Mart, Inc. doing business as Dan's Campers,
entered into substantial commitments to acquire additional inventory because of the additional display area
made available as a result of the assignment of the
lease above referred to.
Moreover, both Mr. Siegel and Trailer Mart, Inc.
have committed themselves to a significant advertising
program based upon the thus expanded sales facilities.
Please be assured that both Mr. Siegel and Trailer
Mart, Inc. will comply with all of the obligations of
the Lessee under the lease referred to hereinabove.

DSG:nd
Carbon copy to :
Mr. Max Siegel

Very truly yours,
/ s / David S. Geldzahler
David S. Geldzahler

8
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A t the time Max Siegel received the lease in question, he was president of three corporations: Siegel
Trailer and Auto Finance, a Utah corporation, (TR.
415) which received the real property tax notices concerning the leased premises (Exhibit 45P), and financed the trailer and recreational vehicle sales; Western
Mobile Homes Insurance Agency, Inc., a Utah corporation (TR. 419) which insured the mobile homes
sold on the contiguous Jensen property; and Trailer
Mart, Inc., a Nevada corporation, (TR. 416) which
sold the trailers and recreational vehicles on the leased
premises.
No evidence was presented:
1) That a board meeting was held by Trailer
Mart, Inc., prior to Max Siegel's negotiations with
Husky Oil Company of Delaware, orally authorizing
Max Siegel to act on its behalf in taking the assignment of the lease,
2) That Max Siegel was authorized to act on behalf of Trailer Mart, Inc. without a meeting of its
board of directors,
3) That written authorization was given by Trailer Mart, Inc. to Max Siegel to act on its behalf in taking the assignment of the lease from Husky Oil Company of Delaware,
4) That a board meeting was held by Trailer
Mart, Inc. subsequently ratifying on behalf of the corporation the taking of the lease by Max Siegel, and

9
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5) That Trailer Mart, Inc. gave anything of
value to Max Siegel for an assignment of the lease.
(TR. 516).
Nevertheless, over the repeated objections of counsel
for Husky Oil Company of Delaware, the District
Court found that Max Siegel was acting as agent for
Trailer Mart, Inc. when he acquired the lease from
Husky Oil Company of Delaware.
Max Siegel died on June 3, 1969, thirty-three days
after taking the assignment of the lease from Husky
Oil Company of Delaware. Eva Siegel, Executrix
named in the Last Will and Testament of Max Siegel,
then sent a letter to the Zeeses concerning the lease
option on June 16, 1969, more than one month prior
to her receipt of letters testamentary (Probate File
#56090). The letter (Exhibit 8P) was drafted by
Mrs. Siegel's attorney, David S. Geldzahler, (TR.
499) and reads as follows:
Eva Siegel
4155 Mount Olympus W a y
Salt Lake City, Utah
June 16,1969
Mr. George Zeese
734 South 13th East
£ait Lake City, Utah
Dear Mr. Zeese:
As the Executrix named in the Last Will and
Testament of my husband, Max Siegel, who died on
10
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June 3, 1969, I am, on behalf of the estate of Max
Siegel, deceased, hereby advising and notifying you of
the exercise of the option to renew the lease originally
made by and between you and Emily Zeese, as Lessors, and Saturn Oil Company, as Lessees, which lease
was on May 1, 1969, assigned by Husky Oil Company
to Max Siegel.
The exercise of this option by the estate of Max
Siegel will, of course, result in the extension of this
original lease for an additional term of 10 years commencing December 18, 1969, and ending December 17,
1979, unless the option to renew the said lease for an
additional ten-year term is exercised at such time.
Very truly yours,
/ s / Eva Siegel
Eva Siegel, Executrix
Named in the Last Will
and Testament of
Max Siegel, Deceased
ES:DSG:nd
The District Court found that Eva Siegel as Executrix named in the Last Will and Testament of Max
Siegel, deceased, sent the above letter as agent for
Trailer Mart, Inc. even though D a n Siegel, current
president of Trailer Mart, Inc., testified that the corporation did not send a letter regarding the lease option
(TR. 533):
11
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Q. (By Mr. Theodore) Okay. Did Trailer
Mart, Inc., ever send a letter to the Zeeses exercising the option ?
A. No.
No evidence was introduced that a board meeting
was held giving oral authorization to Eva Siegel to act
as agent for Trailer Mart, Inc. Nor was evidence introduced that written authorization was given to Eva
Siegel to act as agent for Trailer Mart, Inc.
Probate File #56090 indicates:
1) That Eva Siegel did not petition the Probate
Court pursuant to section 75-11-8, U.C.A., 1953, as
amended, for permission to continue any business interests Max Siegel may have had in Trailer Mart, Inc.
and exercise the option on its behalf,
2) That Eva Siegel did not list the lease in the inventory of the Estate of Max Siegel, even though she
filed amended schedules to include later discovered
properties,
3) That Eva Siegel did not list the lease as a
liability of the Estate of Max Siegel as she had done
with other debts of Max Siegel, and
4) That none of the parties filed claims against
the Estate of Max Siegel to enforce the lease obligations after notice to creditors had been published.
The lease was not listed on the Utah estate tax
returns or the Federal estate tax returns (TR. 392),
and Eva Siegel did not give anything of value to the
Zeeses to exercise the option to extend the lease (TR.
449).

12
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Trailer Mart, Inc. sent monthly checks (Exhibit
I D ) to George Zeese who cashed these checks believing that the lease had expired with Max Siegel's death
(TR. 449), and that Trailer Mart, Inc. was a month
to month tenant. Mr. Zeese's beliefs were based upon
his election not to file a claim against the Estate of
Max Siegel to enforce the lease obligations, and his
conversations with D a n Siegel who handled the day to
day business affairs of the Estate of Max Siegel (TR.
500). Most of these conversations occurred during the
Fall of 1972 and the Spring of 1973 when D a n Siegel
was negotiating to buy the entire Emily Zeese property
(TR. 450, 453, 454) for his seven year old niece,
Valerie Richter; not Trailer Mart, Inc. As part of
these negotiations, D a n Siegel had an appraisal made
of the property (Exhibit 9P) which contained representations that the lease had been assigned to Max
Siegel, an individual, and that the appraised value in
1972 was $143,000.00 subject to a $73,779.00 leasehold
interest. George Zeese denied that the property was
subject to a leasehold interest and refused to discount
the selling price (TR. 512). D a n Siegel then agreed
in the Spring of 1973 to purchase the property as
trustee for his niece for $150,000.00 (See the terms
of the sale which Dan wrote on the back of his business
card, Exhibit 10P). However, the sale negotiations
terminated when D a n Siegel insisted upon the right to
subordinate the proposed installment sale contract to a
building loan (TR. 455).
Plaintiffs then served notices of termination upon
the defendants to vacate the premises in 30 days since
13

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the option to extend the lease in question was not exercised, and the defendants were violating the restrictive
use covenants by operating a recreational vehicle and
trailer sales outlet on the premises. Defendants refused to vacate the premises or alter the use of the
premises to reinstate the lease.
After notices to quit had been served, Eva Siegel,
Executrix, petitioned the Probate Court on August
21, 1973 for permission to distribute the assets of the
Estate of Max Siegel, and disclaimed any interest that
the Estate of Max Siegel may have had in property
not listed in the inventory (Probate File #56090). The
Estate of Max Siegel then answered plaintiffs' complaint by claiming a contingent interest in the lease in
question, and filed a $780,000.00 counterclaim without petitioning the Probate Court for permission to
do so (Probate File #56090).
On December 7, 1973, the District Court granted
plaintiffs' motion to require the Estate of Max Siegel
to deposit into Court, pending the outcome of the case,
the accumulating rent and taxes allegedly owing plaintiffs as outlined in its pleadings. Various parties then
deposited the accumulating rent and taxes into court
on behalf of the Estate of Max Siegel, over the repeated objections of plaintiffs' counsel (Motion for
Order to Show Cause, Objections to Findings on Plaintiffs' Motion for an Order to Show Cause, TR. 637).

14
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H E D I S T R I C T COURT E R R E D I N
F I N D I N G T H A T MAX SIEGEL ACTED AS
AGENT F O R T R A I L E R MART, INC. W H E N
H E TOOK T H E ASSIGNMENT OF T H E
L E A S E I N Q U E S T I O N F R O M H U S K Y OIL
COMPANY OF D E L A W A R E .
Plaintiffs contend that the District Court erred
in finding that Max Siegel was acting as agent for
Trailer Mart, Inc., when he took the assignment of
the lease from Husky Oil Company of Delaware, because the evidence, the law, and the positions taken by
defendants' counsel do not justify the finding.
Specifically, plaintiffs' first objection to the District Court's finding of Max Siegel's agency is based
on Exhibit 6P, the assignment in question. Exhibit
6P is the best evidence of the negotiations which occurred 33 days before Max Siegel's death, and leaves
no doubt that Max Siegel was acting as an individual
when he took the assignment of the lease. The document is clear and unambiguous that Max Siegel was
not acting on behalf of any corporation when he entered
into the lease assignment. Indeed, it was deliberately
modified to dispel any inference that he had taken the
assignment on behalf of a corporation. No other conclusion can be drawn from the alteration of the corporate acknowledgement form on the signature page
to conform with the introduction clause on page one
15
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of the lease to indicate that Max Siegel signed as an
individual.
Therefore, the District Court erred in making findings contrary to the parole evidence rule by relying on
parole testimony to establish Max Siegel's agency at
the time he entered into the assignment, because there
is no ambiguity on the face of the instrument indicating that he was acting as agent for Trailer Mart, Inc.
As this Court stated in Mathis vs. Madsen, 1 U.2d 46,
261 P.2d 952 (1953); and reaffirmed in E. A. Strout
Western Realty Agency, Inc. vs. Owen H. Broderick,
No. 13479 filed April 30, 1974 ...U.2d...., 522 P.2d 144
(1974); citing B. T. Moran, Inc. vs. First Security
Corp., 82 TJ. 316, 24 P.2d 384 (1933); and Hatch vs.
Adams, 8 U.2d 82, 329 P.2d 285 (1958) :
". . . I n searching for the meaning the Court
must first examine the language used in the instrument itself and accord to it the weight and
effect which the instrument itself may show that
the parties intended the words to have. If then
its meaning is still ambiguous or uncertain, the
Court may consider other contemporaneous writings concerning the same subject matter, and
may, if it is still uncertain, consider parole evidence of the parties' intention. See Burt vs.
Stringfellow, 45 Utah 207, 143 P . 234; Beagley
v. United States Gypsum Co., Utah, 235 P.2d
783."
The three contemporaneous writings [the letter
from Husky Oil Company of Delaware's attorney
dated May 6, 1969 (Exhibit 6P) containing a copy
16
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of the assignment; the letter from David S. Geldzahler
dated May 8, 1969 (Exhibit 7P) also containing a
copy of the assignment; and the letter from Eva Siegel,
Executrix named in the Last Will and Testament of
Max Siegel, which was drafted by Mr. Geldzahler and
dated June 16, 1969 (Exhibit 8 P ) ] do not alter the
fact that Max Siegel took the assignment of the lease
from Husky Oil Company of Delaware as an individual.
Therefore, unless this Court is willing to condone
findings based on the testimony of Dan Siegel recalling a long-distance telephone conversation overhead
from another room four years before, the District Court
erred. Especially it erred when this witness admitted
that he was not part of the assignment negotiations
(TR. 546)! One also wonders why Dan Siegel had prepared and presented to Mr. Zeese in the Fall of 1972
Exhibit 9P, the appraisal, which indicated that Max
Siegel and his successors and assigns had the lease in
question, not Trailer Mart, Inc.
Plaintiffs' second objection to the District Court's
finding of Max Siegel's agency is based on the law.
Sections 25-5-1 and 3, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, state:
25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property.—No
estate or interest in real property, other than
leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any
trust or power over or concerning real property
or in any manner relating thereto, shall be
created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law,
or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed
17
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by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing, (emphasis added)
25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands.
—Every contract for the leasing for a longer
period than one year, or for the sale, of any lands,
or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the
contract, or some note or memorandum thereof,
is in writing subscribed by the party by whom the
lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent
thereunto authorized in writing, (emphasis
added)
Therefore, under Utah law, to act as an agent for a
corporation, one must be authorized by a corporation
to act on its behalf. As this Court stated in Mathis vs.
Madsen, supra :
"The statute of frauds, sec. 25-5-1, U.C.A. 1953,
provides that no interest shall be created in real
property unless it is in writing subscribed by the
party to be charged or 'by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.' Naturally, that section is applicable to agents of corporations, but
the courts in interpreting similar provisions have
adopted an exception when the person who acts
under an oral authorization is either a general
agent or executive officer of the corporation."
(emphasis added)
I n that case, this Court held that where a corporate
officer was orally given authorization by the Board of
Directors of the Davis County Co-op prior to his entering into a land purchase contract (as evidenced by the
minutes of a corporate meeting held prior to the trans18
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action, which were entered into the record), the statute
of frauds was not applicable to void the transaction.
No evidence was introduced in the present case that
Trailer Mart, Inc. ever held a meeting to authorize
Max Siegel, its president in 1969, to enter into an assignment of the lease on its behalf. Indeed, there is no
evidence in the record that Trailer Mart, Inc., ever
authorized Max Siegel to enter into lease contracts at
all; not to mention the lease in question.
When the lack of evidence of Max Siegel's corporate authorization was pointed out to the District
Court, the Court ruled these laws do not apply to family corporations (TR. 633, 634):
T H E C O U R T : You mean resolution of the
Board of Directors or something?
MR. T H E O D O R E : Board of Directors, Articles of Incorporation, any such as this. Nothing was presented in the record, Your Honor.
T H E C O U R T : Of course, that isn't—that
isn't the law with regard to corporations with
few shareholders. As I recall the law is that—
MR. T H E O D O R E : Your Honor, that case
specifically went to corporation authorizing an
agent.
T H E C O U R T : Of course, the law draws a
distinction between a corporation like General
Motors, for example, and a corporation consisting of a family type corporation where someone acts with apparent authority and there is
nobody to object.
19
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For this Court to uphold the District Court's ruling
by carving an exception to the laws governing the
manner in which family owned corporations may conduct business would circumvent the laws of the State
of Utah. The legislature has specifically prescribed
under sections 16-10-25, 16-10-40, and 16-10-49, U.C.A.,
1953, as amended, the manner in which corporate business may be conducted without a meeting of the board
of directors. Therefore, where no affirmative evidence
was presented that Max Siegel as president of Trailer
Mart, Inc. had authority under the articles of incorporation, the corporate by-laws or the written consent of
all the members of the Board of Directors, to bind the
corporation without a meeting of its board, the District
Court erred in implying this authority simply because
the corporation was owned by the Siegel family. Were
the law otherwise, parties dealing with family corporations would never know if they were dealing with the
corporation or with the officers as individuals. One
would suspect that if the District Court's ruling were
adopted, it would result in officers of family corporations electing to use the corporate veil when liabilities
were encountered, and to disregard it when unfavorable
contracts were to be voided under the statute of frauds.
Nor can it be said that Trailer Mart, Inc. was the
alter ego of Max Siegel, and therefore all of his actions
were performed on behalf of Trailer Mart, Inc. The
record clearly indicates that at the time of the assignment of the lease, Max Siegel was the president of at
least three corporations which were operating on the
20
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Zeese property and the contiguous Jensen property:
Siegel Trailer and Auto Finance, Inc.; Western Mobile Homes Insurance Agency, Inc.; and Trailer Mart,
Inc.
In summary, the evidence introduced at the trial
is not sufficient under the law to take the assignment
of the lease in question out of the statute of frauds if
Max Siegel were acting as agent for Trailer Mart, Inc.
Therefore, the assignment was either void ab initio, or
it was entered into with Max Siegel as an individual.
Plaintiffs' third objection to the District Court's
finding of Max Siegel's agency is based on the fact
that defendants' counsel during the course of this law
suit have already conceded that Max Siegel was not
acting as agent for Trailer Mart, Inc. when he took
the assignment from Husky Oil Company of Delaware.
The first time counsel conceded this point was at
the hearing dated December 7, 1973 on Plaintiffs'
Motion to Deposit Amounts Due I n Court pursuant
to Rule 67 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiffs brought their motion to have the Estate of
Max Siegel deposit into court the accumulating rents
and taxes allegedly due and owing plaintiffs under
paragraphs 61, 62, 64, 7, 19, 22, 26, and 27 of its
answer to plaintiffs' complaint:
61. That Trailer Mart, Inc. if not in possession of the premises as assignee of the Estate of
Max Siegel is in possession as a subtenant of the
Estate of Max Siegel.
21

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

62. Trailer Mart, Inc. is in possession of the
premises as a subtenant of the Estate of Max
Siegel and at all times has performed in accord
with the lease agreement and is in possession of
the premises by virtue of a valid and existing
lease and subletting thereof.
64. That Eva Siegel as Executrix of the E s tate of Max Siegel and Trailer Mart, Inc. are
in possession of the premises by virtue of a valid
and existing lease and at all times have performed in accord with the lease agreement and
stand ready to continue to perform.
7. On or about the 1st day of May, 1969,
Husky Oil Company assigned all of its right,
title and interest in and to the premises and the
lease to Max Siegel; a copy of that assignment
is marked as Exhibit " D " and attached to plaintiffs' original Complaint.
19. The lease in question was assigned by Eva
Siegel as Executrix of the Estate of Max Siegel,
to Trailer Mart, Inc.
22. Plaintiffs have at all material times recognized that Trailer Mart, Inc. was properly in
possession of the premises as assignee of the
Estate of Max Siegel, deceased.
26. Trailer Mart, Inc., if not in possession of
the premises as assignee of the Estate of Max
Siegel, deceased, is in possession of the premises
as a subtenant of the Estate and has at all times
performed in accord with the lease agreement
and is in possession of the premises by virtue of
a valid and existing lease and subletting thereto.
27. Trailer Mart, Inc., if not in possession of
the premises as assignee of the Estate of Max
22
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Siegel, deceased, is in possession of the premises
as a subtenant of the Estate of Maw Siegel, deceased.
After the motion was argued, with the defendant Estate
of Max Siegel and plaintiffs appearing through counsel, the Honorable Ernest F . Baldwin, Jr., ordered the
defendant, Estate of Max Siegel, to deposit into Court
the monies due plaintiffs as alleged in its answer to
plaintiffs' complaint. Various parties then deposited
monies into Court on behalf of the Estate of Max
Siegel over the objections of plaintiffs' counsel which
were made because the estate had been distributed, and
no petition to reopen it had been made. At no time
did counsel for the Estate of Max Siegel indicate that
Max Siegel took the lease as agent for Trailer Mart,
Inc., so that the Estate of Max Siegel had no interest
in the lease. Nor was an order sought modifying Judge
Baldwin's order.
The second time that counsel conceded this point
was at the trial on May 16, 1974. I n his opening statement, Mr. Heyrend, stated ( T B . 402):
". . . Perhaps the most difficult and tricky conceptual part of this case is the fact that there was
no signed document from Max Siegel to Trailer
Mart, Inc., assigning that particular piece of
property. However, the law in this area does
not require an assignment, a written document
of any specific form or even a written document."
When later asked by the District Court to clarify his
position, Mr. Heyrend again conceded this point ( T B .
427, 428):
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T H E C O U R T : Well, what's your position
Mr. Heyrend? You acknowledge that Mr. Siegel took an assignment of the lease from Husky
Oil Company?
MR. H E Y R E N D : That's correct.
T H E C O U R T : What's your position as to
what he did with them thereafter or what happened to the assignment of that lease thereafter?
MR. H E Y R E N D : It's our position it is now
with Trailer Mart, Inc.
T H E C O U R T : Well, how did it get there ?
MR. H E Y R E N D : That it was assigned—
we have two—two theories.
For the reasons outlined above, plaintiffs contend
that the District Court erred in finding that Max Siegel
acted as agent for Trailer Mart, Inc. when he took
the assignment of the lease from Husky Oil Company
of Delaware.
POINT II

UPON THE DEATH OF A LESSEE, THE
LEASED PROPERTY COMES INTO THE
POSSESSION OF HIS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE.
As outlined in Point I, plaintiffs contend that the
District Court erred in making its finding that Max
Siegel was acting as agent for Trailer Mart, Inc. when
he took the assignment of the lease in question. Therefore, upon his death, the lease came into the possession
24
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of Eva Siegel as Executrix, since no evidence was presented that Max Siegel ever assigned the lease to
Trailer Mart, Inc. during the thirty-three days before
his death. Indeed, Dan Siegel testified that no firm
commitment as to the use of the leased premises was
entered into by and between Max Siegel and Trailer
Mart, Inc. (TR. 505):
Q. (By Mr. Theodore) You have just stated
that Trailer Mart, Inc. paid no rent to your
father for the use of the premises at 6210 South
State?
A. Correct.
Q. All right. Did Trailer Mart, Inc. have a
firm commitment from Max Siegel as to a term
of the use of the premises?
A. I n writing you mean or something like
that?
Q. Well, yes. In writing.
A. No.
H e also testified that no consideration was given to
Max Siegel or the Estate of Max Siegel for an assignment of the lease (TR. 516):
Q. Did Trailer Mart, Inc. ever give the estate
or Max Siegel anything of value for an assignment of the lease?
A. No.
Therefore, as outlined in Thompson On Real Property,
Vol. 3A, §1207 (Fourth Edition 1959, 1965 Supp.), no
assignment of the lease to Trailer Mart, Inc. occurred
where no consideration was given to Max Siegel.
25
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Nor was any evidence introduced that Max Siegel
ever disclaimed an interest in the lease as required under
the Jensen vs OK Investment Corporation criteria, 29
U.2d 231, 507 P.2d 713 (1973) for his subtenant
Trailer Mart, Inc. to become the lessee. On the contrary, Eva Siegel's letter (Exhibit 8P) clearly indicates an intent on the part of his legal successor, the
Estate of Max Siegel, to claim an interest in the lease!
The unexpired portion of the lease therefore passed
into the Estate of Max Siegel upon his death. This
rule of succession is found in Brown's Executor vs.
United States Trust Co., 185 Ky. 747, 215 S.W. 815
(1919); and followed in Olson et at. vs. Frazer et al,
154 Kan. 310, 118 P.2d 505 (1941); Southern Pacific
Company vs. Swanson, 73 CA 229, 238 P . 736 (1925);
and Joost vs. Castel, 33 CA 2d 138, 91 P.2d 172
(1939). The Kentucky Court stated :
". . . when a lessee of property like this dies, the
leased property comes into the possession of his
personal representative, and he has only three
rights of election in respect to it: First, he may
keep the property, thereby charging the estate
with the performance of the terms and conditions
of the lease. Second, he may, if the contract or
statute permit it, sublease the premises; but this
would not, of course, relieve the estate of its obligation to satisfy the terms and conditions of
the lease as between it and the landlord. Third,
he may surrender the leased property to the
landlord, and refuse to have anything further
to do with it, thereby working a cancellation of
the lease; but the doing of this would subject the
estate to a suit for damages by the landlord for
breach of contract."
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The right to renew a lease also passes to the representative of a deceased lessee, and, if he fails to exercise the
lease option, the lease terminates; see Hart et al. vs.
Walker, 40 N.M. 1, 52 P.2d 123 (1935).
Therefore, upon the death of Max Siegel, the lease
held by him passed to his legal representative, Eva
Siegel as Executrix, to be listed as an asset of the
estate and properly accounted for as required by Miller
vs. Ready, 59 I n A 195, 108 N . E . 605 (1915); and
discussed in 68 A.L.R. 590, and 5lC C.J.S. Landlord
and Tenant §92:
"In case of the death of the lessee, the term or
the unexpired portion thereof becomes a part of
the personal assets of the estate, to be inventoried, appraised, and sold as any other personal
property."
Eva Siegel, acting as Executrix, would then have
had to exercise the option in the manner specified to
extend the lease as discussed in the Aiken vs. Less Taylor Motor Company case, 110 U. 265, 171 P.2d 676
(1946):
"It is elementary that an option to renew contained in a lease must be exercised to effect the
renewal. Usually affirmative acts are required
either by the express terms of the lease or by
implication of law to exercise the option to renew . . .
Though the ordinary case requires affirmative
acts to exercise the option to renew, the parties
to a lease may specify any method they choose of
the way the option is to be exercised."
27
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Also, see Nance vs. Schoonover, No. 13471 Filed April
23, 1974, ....U.2d...., 521 P.2d 896 (1974), and the cases
cited therein. Since the parties to the lease by and between George and Emily Zeese and Saturn Oil Company agreed that:
"As a further consideration of this Lease, L E S SOR hereby gives and grants unto the L E S S E E the exclusive option and privilege of renewing and extending the Lease for T H R E E
(3) additional terms of T E N (10) Y E A R S
each, provided L E S S E E shall give notice in
writing to L E S S O R on or before 60 days before the expiration of the original term of this
Lease or any succeeding option term."
Eva Siegel, acting as executrix, would have had to
send written notice of her intent to exercise the option
to extend the lease on behalf of the Estate of Max
Siegel prior to October 28,1969.
When she sent Exhibit 8P regarding the lease
option on June 16, 1969, more than one month prior to
her receipt of letters testamentary, Eva Siegel would
have had to have been exercising one of those executory
powers enumerated in Section 74-3-19, U.C.A., 1953,
as amended:
74-3-19. Executor must qualify—Limited power
before letters issue.—No person has any power
as an executor until he qualifies, except that before letters have been issued he may pay funeral charges and take necessary measures for the
preservation of the estate.
Because the probate file does not indicate that the lease
was extended and included as part of the Estate of
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Max Siegel, Eva Siegel was not protecting an asset
of the estate in sending Exhibit 8 P ; and therefore her
offer was void under the recent Estate Realty, Inc. vs.
Kershaw ruling, 29 U.2d 92, 505 P.2d 777 (1973). In
that case, this Court voided a real estate sales commission contract because it was signed by an executor one
month prior to his receipt of letters testamentary.
Nor did Eva Siegel have any intention of exercising the lease option to extend the term on behalf of
the Estate of Max Siegel. This is evidenced by her
failure to inventory the lease, set aside a contingent
fund to satisfy future rents, and to list the lease on
the federal and state estate tax returns. 1 H a d she so
intended, she had three months from the date she received letters testamentary to petition the Probate
Court for permission to exercise the lease option or to
ratify the sending of Exhibit 8P. Indeed, where she
was aware of the necessity of petitioning the Probate
Court to enter into contracts on behalf of the Estate
of Max Siegel (as evidenced by the petition filed September 16, 1969 for permission to borrow money on
behalf of the estate), her failure to get court approval
to extend the lease was no oversight. Especially when
i See 26 U.S.C.A. Internal Revenue Code §2031 which would require that the lease assigned to Max Siegel be included in his
gross estate if the parties had not allowed the lease to lapse;
and its counterpart under Utah law, §59-12-3, U.C.A., 1953,
as amended. Also see Opinions of the Accounting Principles
Board, No. 5, September 1964, Reporting of Leases in Financial
Statements of Lessee as supplemented by Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board, No. 31, June 1973, Disclosure of
Lease Commitments by Lessees, which would also have required that the lease be listed on the financial statements of
the Estate of Max Siegel if the parties had not allowed the
lease to lapse.
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she subsequently petitioned eleven times to enter into
additional contracts to borrow money on behalf of the
estate, and amended the inventory to include after discovered property.
In summary, since Eva Siegel as Executrix did
not inventory the lease by petitioning the Probate Court
for permission to exercise the option to extend the
lease on behalf of the Estate of Max Siegel, she had
no capacity to contract and the offer was void; see
In re Grattan's Estate. Bethel College of Newton vs.
Pihlblad, 155 Kan. 839, 130 P.2d 580 (1942), which
held that executors must render their accounts to the
probate court for approval to bind the estate, especially
for acts committed prior to receipt of letters testamentary. The lease, therefore, expired December 17, 1969.
Nor did any party file a contingent claim against
the Estate of Max Siegel to require Eva Siegel as Executrix to extend the lease and charge the estate with
the performance of its terms and conditions after
notice to creditors had been published pursuant to section 75-9-4, U.C.A., 1953, as amended:
"75-9-4. Claims to be presented within time limits—Exceptions—All claims arising upon contract, whether the same are due, not due or contingent, must be presented within the time limited
in the notice, and any claim not presented is
barred forever; provided, that when it is made
to appear by the affidavit of the claimant, to the
satisfaction of the court or judge thereof, that
the claimant had no notice as provided in this
chapter by reason of being out of state, it may
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be presented at any time before a decree of distribution is entered; provided further, that nothing in this title contained shall be so construed
as to prohibit the foreclosure of liens or mortgages as hereinafter provided."
Simply put, if Trailer Mart, Inc., subtenant of the
Estate of Max Siegel, were relying on the lease in
question, it should have filed a claim against the Estate
of Max Siegel to have Eva Siegel as Executrix extend
the lease and protect its subtenancy rights. Defendants'
claims and counterclaims against the plaintiffs should
therefore be dismissed since the lease expired because
of their own failure to take proper steps to preserve the
lease.
For additional authorities on the necessity of presenting contingent claims against an estate to enforce
the obligations entered into by a decedant, see: Holloran-Judge Trust Co. vs. Heath et. aZ., 70 U. 124, 258
P . 342 (1927) holding that a building management contract entered into prior to the death of the principal
must be filed as a contingent claim against his estate
in order for the contract to be specifically enforced;
Lesser vs. Pomin, 3 CA2d 117, 39 P.2d 451 (1934);
Joost vs. Castel, supra, holding that rents to accrue
under a lease must be filed as a contingent claim against
an estate; Tropico Land and Improvement Co. vs.
Lamhourn, 170 Cal. 33, 148 P . 206 (1915); Verdier
vs. Roach, 96 Cal. 467, 31 P . 554 (1892), holding that
a covenant in a lease for indemnity from water damage
must be presented as a contingent claim even though
the breach has not yet occurred; and Bancroft's Probate
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Practice, Vol. 3, §769, §772, §773, §774, and §786 (Second Edition 1950, 1974 Supp.) for a complete discussion of the necessity of presenting contingent claims
against an estate to enforce the obligations entered into
by a decendent prior to his death.

POINT III
T H E D i a x R I C T COURT E R R E D I N
FINDING THAT EVA SIEGEL, EXECUTRIX NAMED IN T H E LAST W I L L AND
T E S T A M E N T O F M A X S I E G E L , W A S ACTI N G AS A G E N T FOR T R A I L E R MART, INC.
W H E N SHE SENT T H E LETTER REGARDING T H E LEASE OPTION.
Plaintiffs contend that if the finding is correct
that Husky Oil Company of Delaware assigned the
lease directly to Trailer Mart, Inc., the District Court
erred in finding that Eva Siegel, Executrix Named in
the Last Will and Testament of Max Siegel, was acting as agent for Trailer Mart, Inc. when she sent to
the Zeeses Exhibit 8 P regarding the lease option.
First, the finding of Eva Siegel's agency is clearly
contrary to the evidence introduced at trial. Not only
does Exhibit 8 P state that the letter was sent on behalf of the Estate of Max Siegel which claimed the
lease in question, there is no other evidence in the
record to support the finding of Eva Siegel's agency.
When asked if Trailer Mart, Inc., ever sent a letter
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regarding the lease option, Dan Siegel, current president of Trailer Mart, Inc., stated (TR. 533):
Q. (By Mr. Theodore) Okay. Did Trailer
Mart, Inc., ever send a letter to the Zeeses exercising the option?
A. No.
Later, when asked why Eva Siegel sent the letter on
behalf of the Estate of Max Siegel when Trailer Mart,
Inc. was in possession of the property, Dan Siegel explained (TR. 560):
A. When Max died we were trying to cover
a lot of loose ends. This seemed to be one of
them. I t seemed appropriate for the Executrix
of the Estate to notify Mr. Zeese who had undoubted heard of Max's death that the business
was going to be carried on and we did it in the
form of an exercise of the option.
When you are doing business on a day-to-day
basis you often don't look toward the niceties of
the legal entities and we simply as you can see
from the document exercised it in that manner.
This incredulous explanation of Exhibit 8P's meaning is even more perplexing when one notes that the
letter was drafted by Dan and Eva Siegel's attorney,
and that it contains no mention of the business. Nor
was notice ever forwarded to the Zeeses indicating that
the letter was in error. I t is also disturbing to note that
Dan Siegel represented to plaintiffs all during the negotiations to purchase the Zeese property that Max Siegel,
an individual and his legal successors—the Estate of
Max Siegel—had the lease in question, not Trailer
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Mart, Inc. (see page 10 of Exhibit 9P which formed
the basis of the purchase negotiations).
Hence, if the lease were assigned to Trailer Mart,
Inc. by Husky Oil Company of Deleware, the finding
that Eva Siegel, Executrix named in the Last Will
and Testament of Max Siegel, exercised the lease
option on behalf of Trailer Mart, Inc. is not supported
by the record, and is therefore in error. Since Trailer
Mart, Inc. did not exercise the lease option, the lease
expired December 28,1969.
Second, the law does not support Eva Siegel's
agency. Apparently the District Court ignored the
long established principle that death of an agent terminates the agency relationship; see Restatement of Law
Second, Agency, Vol. 1, §121 (1958). Therefore, if
Max Siegel were acting as agent for Trailer Mart, Inc.
in taking the lease from Husky Oil Company of Delaware, upon his death the agency relationship terminated so that his executrix could not substitute as agent
for Trailer Mart, Inc. Also, Eva Siegel as Executrix
did not have the capacity to act as agent for Trailer
Mart, Inc. without petitioning the Probate Court for
permission to continue any business interests Max Siegel may have had in Trailer Mart, Inc. Section 75-118, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, states:
"75-11-8. Continuing decedent's business—When
the interests of creditors are not prejudiced
thereby, the court may prescribe that the business in which the decedent was engaged at the
time of his death may be continued for such
length of time as may be necessary to permit
34
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the affairs of the estate to be wound up to the
best advantage." (emphasis added)
When no petition was filed with the Probate Court to
continue any business interests the decedent may have
had in Trailer Mart, Inc. (assuming contrary to the
evidence introduced that Trailer Mart, Inc. was the
alter ego of Max Siegel), Eva Siegel as Executrix
had no authority to act as agent for Trailer Mart, Inc.
by sending her letter (Exhibit 8 P ) .
The finding of Eva Siegel's "agency" is also contrary to the statute of frauds, sections 25-5-1 and 3,
U.C.A., 1953, as amended, supra. Again, no evidence
was presented:
1) That Trailer Mart, Inc. ever held a board meeting orally authorizing Eva Siegel as Executrix of the
Estate of Max Siegel to exercise the lease option and
extend the term on its behalf,
2) That Trailer Mart, Inc. gave written authorization to Eva Siegel as Executrix of the Estate of Max
Siegel to act as its agent, which this Court required in
the Lee vs. Polyhrones case, 57 U. 401, 195 P . 201
(1921) ; the Baugh vs. Logan City case, 27 U.2d 291,
495 P.2d 814 (1972), holding that the minutes of a
Logan City Commission meeting were not sufficient
authorization under the statute of frauds to allow the
Mayor to bind the City inasmuch as the minutes were
not subscribed by the principals; and the Frandsen vs.
Gerstner case, 26 U.2d 180, 487 P.2d 697 (1971), holding that real estate agents must have separate written
35
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authority from their principals to enter into contracts
to sell land, which is listed with them for sale.
3) That Trailer Mart, Inc. ever held a Board
meeting ratifying the sending of Eva Siegel's letter
regarding the option.
4) That Eva Siegel had authority to act on behalf
of Trailer Mart, Inc., without a meeting of its Board
of Directors, or
5) That the defendants ever complied with the
lease terms by operating a gasoline and oil filling station to take the lease out of the statute of frauds under
the doctrine of part performance (see stipulation of
counsel on page 462 of the Court Transcript).
Trailer Mart, I n c ' s claim of a leasehold interest
is therefore barred under the statute of frauds, and the
lease was either void ab initio or expired on December
28, 1969 when Trailer Mart, Inc. did not exercise the
option to extend the lease.
In summary, if the lease were assigned directly to
Trailer Mart, Inc. by Husky Oil Company of Delaware, the finding that Eva Siegel, Executrix named
in the Last Will and Testament of Max Siegel,
exercised the option to extend the lease on behalf of
Trailer Mart, Inc. is not supported by the record or
the law, and is therefore in error.
At this point it might be helpful to the Court to
point out why the record fails to support the findings
of Trailer Mart, I n c ' s involvement in the lease trans36
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actions. Counsel's theory of proof is found on page
547 of the official transcript:
MR. H E Y R E N D : Well, Mr. Siegel has
testified he was an officer of Trailer Mart and
is answering the questions in that regard. I t is
always a problem when you are dealing with a
corporation because the corporation has no more
substance than the officers themselves and, therefore, any intent of the corporation would be expressed in the intent of any of the officers. To
that extent I think Mr. Siegel was directing
himself.
Even the District Court rejected this manner of proof
at trial (TR. 547):
T H E C O U R T : Of course, he can only
testify to his own intent.
MR. H E Y R E N D : That's correct.
correct as an officer.

That's

T H E C O U R T : As an officer ?
MR. H E Y R E N D : Yes.
T H E C O U R T : As long as we understand we
are talking about his own state of mind.
Apparently counsel tried to impute the agency of Max
Siegel and Eva Eiegel on behalf of Trailer Mart, Inc.
through the testimony of Dan Siegel who did not participate in the assignment negotiations, and who was
not authorized to direct Eva Siegel as Executrix to be
an agent for Trailer Mart, Inc. without approval of
the Probate Court. This witness was therefore not in
privity with the lease, and was also incompetant to
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testify as to the events which took place between Max
Siegel and Husky Oil Company of Delaware.
For this Court to approve this manner of proof
to transfer leases involving estates will result in numerous frauds and sham arrangements designed to bypass the Probate Court and the State Tax Commission. Indeed, it is quite obvious that Eva Siegel was
either trying to avoid probating the lease in question,
or she decided that it had little value in 1969 and
elected to let it lapse. Defendants then tried to claim
a leasehold interest in the property in 1972 when the
construction of a new shopping center across the street
inflated property values in the surrounding area (See
Exhibit 56P, the April 1972 aerial photograph showing
the beginning construction of the shopping center).
This Court should therefore strike down this agency
fiction designed to bypass the Probate Court, and reverse the judgment of the District Court.
POINT IV
T H E DISTRICT COURT E R R E D I N INV O K I N G T H E D O C T R I N E O F E S T O P P E L TO
PRECLUDE P L A I N T I F F S FROM ENFORCING T H E RESTRICTIVE USE COVENANTS
CONTAINED IN T H E LEASE.
If the lease option were exercised, the defendants
breached the lease by operating a trailer and recreational vehicle sales outlet on the premises, and the District Court erred in invoking the doctrine of estoppel
to preclude plaintiffs from enforcing the restrictive use
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covenants contained therein. The Utah law governing
estoppel was outlined in Migliaccio vs. Davis, 120 U. 1,
232P.2dl95 (1951) on page 198:
"Equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais is the
principle by which a party who knows or should
know the truth is absolutely precluded, both at
law and in equity, from denying or asserting the
contrary of, any material fact, which, by his
words or conduct, affirmative or negative, intentionally or through culpable negligence, he
has induced another, who was excusably ignorant
of the true facts and who had a right to rely upon
such words and conduct, to believe and act upon
them thereby, as a consequence reasonably to be
anticipated, changing his position in such a way
that he would suffer injury if such denial or
contrary assertion were allowed/' (Emphasis
added)
Therefore, for an estoppel to arise, there must be:
1) Concealment or misrepresentation of a material fact,
2) Inducement of another to act,
3) Reliance by a party who at the time he acted
had no way of acquiring the true facts through reasonable diligence, and who had a right to rely upon
such words or conduct, and
4) Injury suffered as a consequence of his changed
position if the contrary assertion were allowed.
Applying the facts of the present case to the above
criteria for an estoppel to arise, several elements are
missing:
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a) The plaintiffs did not conceal or misrepresent
any facts to the defendants. Indeed, if the District
Court's findings are correct that Trailer Mart, Inc.
received the lease from Husky Oil Company of Delaware, the only misrepresentations were made by the
defendants representing that the Estate of Max Siegel
had the lease in July 1969 (Exhibit 8P) through the
Fall of 1972 and the Spring of 1973 (Exhibit 9 P ) .
Nor did the plaintiffs conceal from the defendants
that they did not have a valid lease. The evidence introduced concerning the parties' bargaining positions
during the negotiations to sell the Zeese property in the
Fall of 1972 and the Spring of 1973 clearly indicates
that George Zeese refused to acknowledge that the
property was subject to a leasehold interest. When
Dan Siegel presented the appraisal prepared for him
by Raymond S. Fletcher which indicated that Max
Siegel, an individual and his successors and heirs had
a $73,779.00 leasehold interest in the Zeese property
(Exhibit 9 P ) , George Zeese completely rejected Dan
Siegel's representations, and countered, instead, with a
firm selling price of $150,000.00 which was $6,000.00
above the appraised value for the entire property. Dan
Siegel, therefore, knew when George Zeese refused to
discount the selling price in the Fall of 1972 that
George Zeese believed that the lease had lapsed. Indeed, Dan Siegel also believed that the lease had
lapsed inasmuch as he agreed in the Spring of 1973
that the selling price of $150,000.00 would not be discounted $73,779.00 for a leasehold interest [See Ex-
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hibit 10P, Dan Siegel's business card containing the
terms of the sale which he wrote on the back. Also
note that Dan Siegel was negotiating to purchase the
property on behalf of his niece, Valerie Richter, who
had no interest in Trailer Mart, Inc. (TR. 514)].
Simply stated, would a reasonably prudent businessman deliberately waive a $73,779.00 leasehold interest if he had a binding lease? Certainly not. There
is no question that Dan Siegel knew that the lease had
lapsed, and therefore George Zeese would not have a
duty to inform him of that fact.
b) The plaintiffs did not induce Max Siegel to
take an assignment of the lease in question, nor did
they induce Trailer Mart, Inc. to expand its display
area by moving onto the Zeese property from the contiguous Jensen property. Indeed, the Zeeses never met
Max Siegel (TR. 448); and Trailer Mart, Inc., moved
onto the Zeese property the first part of May 1969,
over a week before the Zeeses were notified by Husky
Oil Company of Delaware that the lease had been assigned to Max Siegel, an individual (Exhibit 6 P ) .
c) The defendants at the time they acted were m
a position to ascertain that the lease in question contained restrictive use covenants limiting the use of the
premises to a gasoline and oil filling station since all
parties had a copy of the lease. The defendants were
also in a position to ascertain: 1) that Eva Siegel had
not received letters testamentary to act on behalf of
the Estate of Max Siegel when she sent the letter re41
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garding the lease option, and 2) that Eva Siegel as
Executrix of the Estate of Max Siegel did not list the
lease as an asset or liability of the estate or petition for
permission to exercise the option. Therefore, as outlined in Coombs vs. Ouzounian, 24 U.2d 39, 465 P.2d
356 (1970), since all parties had copies of the lease, and
the means to ascertain Eva Siegel's incapacity to contract, the doctrine of estoppel should not be invoked
(In the Coombs case, supra, this Court ruled that no
estoppel arose to enforce a sale of property when a wife
had not authorized her husband to sign a deed on her
behalf, and the party claiming estoppel had means to
ascertain whether she had done so).
Nor did the defendants have a right to rely on a
leasehold interest since:
i) Dan Siegel, President of Trailer Mart, Inc.,
testified that the corporation did not exercise the option to extend the term of the lease. Therefore, if
Husky Oil Company of Delaware assigned the lease
to Trailer Mart, Inc., the lease lapsed when Trailer
Mart, Inc., failed to exercise the lease option.
ii) If the lease passed into Max Siegel's Estate
upon his death because Husky Oil Company of Delaware assigned the lease to Max Siegel as an individual,
Trailer Mart, Inc., was a subtenant of the Estate of
Max Siegel and therefore not entitled to rely upon an
extension of the lease unless the lease were probated.
As outlined in Cifelli vs. Santamaria, 79 N . J . L . 354,
75 At. 434 (1910):
42
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"Nor was appellant entitled, as a subtenant, to a
renewal of the lease. H e had no privity with the
landlord, is not liable on the tenant's covenants,
and cannot take advantage of the landlord's covenants with the lessee . . .
So, while a lawful assignee of the lease may exercise his assignor's option of renewal, I find no
authority holding that its option may be exercised by an undertenant as such . . . . and it is
quite clear that no such right exists. Hence,
even if it be considered that the acceptance of
rent directly from the appellant as subtenant,
and notice to quit served on him, amounted to a
recognition of his subtenancy, such recognition
did not give him the rights of the original tenant
to a renewal."
Also see Audubon Hotel Co. vs. Braunnig,
1089, 46 So. 33 (1908):

120 L a

"The sublease is a new contract . . . The lessor
is not a party to the sublease, and the subtenant
is not a party to the original lease. There is no
contractual tie between the subtenant and the
owner or lessor. The lease of the subtenant terminates with the lease from whom he holds as tenant. The lessee of the owner stands between the
subtenant and the lessor, the owner. It is as to
the former, his lessor, that the subtenant must
address himself in asserting his rights. The subtenant cannot defeat the original lessor suing to
be reinstated in the possession of the property
after his lease has expired. I t is true that the
subtenant has all the lessee's right to enjoy the
property. This right does not go further. I t does
not include in addition the right of renewal given
by the first lessor to his lessee. A subtenant has
no action against the owner or original lessor for
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a renewal of the lease by reason of the fact that
there is no contract between him and the original
lessor, and no legal tie which he can invoke."
(emphasis added)
and M. B. Zeldman vs. A. Davis, 161 Tx 496, 342
S.W.2d555 (1961):
"There is no privity of contract between a sublessee and the original lessor . . . And so it is held
that a sub-lessee does not acquire or succeed to
the option of a lessee to purchase the premises
• . . or to his option to renew the lease.
Since Davis (sublessee) had no legal right to exercise the option and thus to extend the term of
the lease, his misinterpretation of the lease and
detrimental conduct under the misinterpretation
would not confer on him the right to exercise the
option belatedly or estop the lessors from asserting that the option had not been timely exercised
by Landry (lessee, sublessor)."
This privity of contract principle is also found in Loudave Estates, Inc. vs. Cross Roads Improvements Co.
Inc., 28 M.2d 54, 214 N.Y. Supp. 2d 72 (1961):
Novosad vs. Clary, 431 S.W.2d 422 (1968); Hart et
al vs. Walker, supra, where the New Mexico Supreme
Court ruled that even the heirs of a deceased lessee
could not exercise a renewal option if the administrator
refused to renew a state land lease; 127 A.L.R. 948,
and 51 A.L.R.2d 1404.
Therefore, since Trailer Mart, Inc. as a subtenant
was not in privity with the lease to exercise the option,
and Eva Siegel did not exercise the option to extend
the lease on behalf of the Estate of Max Siegel, the
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lease terminated December 28, 1969. The Estate of
Max Siegel and its subtenants then became month to
month hold over tenants.
iii) No consideration was given to the plaintiffs to
exercise the option and extend the lease for an additional term, or to modify its restrictive use covenants.
As the Supreme Court of the State of Washington observed in construing a gasoline and oil filling station
lease identical to the one in question, the option provisions lack mutuality since no additional benefit or
consideration is conferred on the lessor to extend the
lease when the lessee merely sends written notice of his
intention to extend the lease, see Logan vs. Time Oil
Company, 73 Wash.2d 161, 437 P.2d 192 (1968). That
Court recognized the grave inequities which arise where
a lessee attempts to overdraft a lease and get something for nothing. This dispute presents a sublessee
which not only refused to pay anything for the right
to extend the lease term, but refused to pay anything
for the right to modify the restrictive use covenants.
Indeed, defendant Trailer Mart, Inc. claims extensive
damages if it loses a leasehold interest; not for damages
incurred, but for the loss of a bargain! (Note the method of computing the $780,000.00 counterclaim on page
6 of Dan Siegel's Answers to Interrogatories.) No
better example can be found of a party trying to take
advantage of an overdrafted lease taken behind the back
of the lessor who was negotiating with the lessee Husky
Oil Company of Delaware to cancel the lease (TR.
444). This Court is therefore strongly urged to cancel
45
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the lease as lacking mutuality as it did the employment
contract in the Allen vs. Rose Park Pharmacy case,
120 U. 608, 237 P.2d 823 (1951).
In summary, the elements of estoppel are not supported by the evidence, and the District Court erred
in invoking the doctrine. The District Court apparently confused the doctrine of estoppel with the doctrine of waiver which is discussed in Point V.

POINT V
T H E D I S T R I C T COURT E R R E D I N INVOKING T H E D O C T R I N E O F W A I V E R TO
PRECLUDE P L A I N T I F F S FROM ENFORCING T H E RESTRICTIVE USE COVENANTS
CONTAINED IN T H E LEASE.
If the lease option were exercised, the defendants
breached the lease, and the District Court erred in invoking the doctrine of waiver to preclude the plaintiff's
from enforcing the restrictive use covenants.
In the second paragraph on page 4 of the lease,
the parties covenanted that:
"No waiver of any forfeiture, by acceptance of
rent or otherwise shall waive any subsequent
breach of any conditions of this Lease; nor shall
any consent to any assignment or subletting of
said premises, as aforesaid, be held to waive or
release any assignee or sublessee from any of the
foregoing conditions or covenants as against him
46
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or them, but every such assignee or sublessee
shall be expressly subject thereto."
All parties therefore understood that the use of the
premises was to be governed strictly by the lease provisions when they agreed that there would be no waiver
of any forfeiture, by acceptance of rent of otherwise.
Indeed, Saturn Oil Company specifically negotiated
for the right to erect and operate a gasoline and oil
filling station and drafted the lease accordingly. Saturn Oil Company, its successors and assigns, further
covenanted in the sixth paragraph on page 3 of the
lease to remedy any breach of the restrictive use covenants within 30 days from the date of notice of termination :
". . . failure of the L E S S E E to promptly keep
and perform each and every covenant, agreement
and obligation of this Lease on the part of the
L E S S E E to be kept and performed, shall, at
the option of the L E S S O R , cause the forfeiture
of this Lease. If the L E S S E E shall be in default of any of its obligations under this Lease,
L E S S E E " s h a l l have thirty (30) Days from
date of notice by L E S S O R to correct such default, and if such default shall not be corrected,
possession of the within demised premises and all
additions and permanent improvements therof
shall be delivered to the L E S S O R , and thereupon L E S S O R shall be entitled to and may take
possession of the demised premises, any other
notice or demand being hereby waived."
Therefore, the plaintiffs, by accepting rent, did not
waive the right to object to the defendants' continuing
breach of the lease in maintaining a recreational vehicle
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and trailer sales outlet on the premises after notice of
plaintiffs' election to enforce strictly the provisions of
the lease.
As outlined in Robinson vs. Hadley,
(1965) (9thCir. C.A.):

351 F.2d 385

"This rule is especially applicable where the lease
expressly provides that the waiver of any breach
should not be deemed a waiver of a subsequent
breach."
Also, see Thompson On Real Property, Vol. 3A, §1328
(Fourth Edition 1959,1965 Supp., p. 578:
"Yet, even after an estoppel, if the covenantee
gives notice that he intends henceforth to stand
upon his legal right, it has been held that he may
enforce the terms of the contract strictly from
that time on."
and p. 581 :
"Any inference of a waiver by the landlord of a
forfeiture of the lease by acceptance of the rent
with knowledge of a breach of condition or covenant is rebutted by a provision in the lease that
the receipt of rent with knowledge of any breach
shall not be deemed a waiver."
This general rule is outlined in 49 Am.Jur.2d §1063,
page 1027:
"But the general rule is that a waiver of a
right of forfeiture for breach of a covenant in a
lease does not operate as a waiver with respect
to a continuance of the breach, where the breach
is a continuing one, and it does not operate as a
waiver of the right of forfeiture for a subsequent
48
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breach of the covenant. Thus the receipt of rent
by a landlord with knowledge of the breach of
conditions in a lease does not estop him from
declaring a forfeiture for a continuance of the
cause of the forfeiture after the acceptance of
rent or for subsequent breaches of the covenant."
and also found in 5lC Corpus Juris Secundum, Landlord and Tenant §117 (6).
The plaintiffs were therefore not precluded from
enforcing the restrictive use covenants contained in the
lease, since the defendants are unable to raise the defense of waiver without breaching the lease. Clearly
the District Court erred in sustaining the defense of
waiver.
The District Court's election to divide the trial of
plaintiffs' cause of action into the issue of liability, and
the issue of damages was unfortunate since plaintiffs
were not given the opportunity of presenting evidence
of their damages resulting from the defendants operation of a trailer and recreational vehicle sales outlet.
The importance of these restrictive use covenants was
consequently lost to the District Court. Plaintiffs would
have established that the recreational vehicle and trailer
displays act as a wall isolating the rear portion of the
property from further commercial development which
can be seen from the aerial photograph taken in July
1973 (Exhibit 44P). A gasoline and oil filling station
operation allows traffic to flow from State Street
through the frontage of the property thereby allowing
further commercial development of the rear of the prop49
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erty. The District Court's ruling leaves the plaintiffs
with landlocked property without any compensation
from the defendants for the right to modify the restrictive use covenants which were negotiated by the
defendants' predecessor, Saturn Oil Company.
I t is also difficult to understand the District
Court's reasoning for invoking waiver. The ruling emphasized that the defendants acted in reliance upon a
lease even though they never complied with its restrictions or paid to have them modified. In effect, the District Court ruled that the plaintiffs had been generous
in allowing the defendants to use their property contrary to the lease restrictions without compensation,
and now that the plaintiffs need the property utilized
in conformance with the lease provisions which the defendants agreed to, it is too much of a hardship for the
defendants to comply with their bargain!
The ruling also emphasized that the plaintiffs
didn't inform the defendants of the lease restrictions
with which defendants' attorney assured the Zeeses that
they would comply. Again, the District Court in effect
ruled that plaintiffs had a written lease agreement with
the defendants outlining the terms and conditions for
the use of the property, but they should have explained
those terms and conditions to the defendants and their
counsel! Simply put, would a landlord respond to a
letter of assurances sent by lessee's attorney (See the
last paragraph in Exhibit 7 P ) :
"Please be assured that both Mr. Siegel and
Trailer Mart, Inc., will comply with all of the
50
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obligations of the Lessee under the lease referred
to hereinabove."
by explaining the lease terms to his attorney?
Plaintiffs therefore urge this Court to enforce the
lease restrictions originally bargained for, and reverse
the District Court's invocation of the doctrine of waiver
to preclude the enforcement of the restrictive use covenants contained in the lease.

POINT VI
T H E D I S T R I C T COURT E R R E D IN INVOKING T H E DOCTRINE OF E S T O P P E L
A N D W A I V E R TO P R E C L U D E P L A I N T I F F S
FROM JUDGMENT AGAINST HUSKY OIL
COMPANY OF D E L A W A R E FOR BREACH
OF T H E LEASE BY ITS ASSIGNEE, TRAILE R MART, INC.
If the District Court's findings are correct that
Trailer Mart, Inc. exercised the lease option but
breached the restrictive use covenants contained in the
lease, the District Court erred in precluding plaintiffs
from judgment against Husky Oil Company of Delaware by invoking the doctrine of waiver and estoppel.
Plaintiffs based their causes of action against Husky
Oil Company of Delaware on the sixth paragraph on
page 2 of the lease which states:
u

This lease shall be assignable by the L E S S E E
without the consent of the L E S S O R provided
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that LESSEE
shall at all times be liable for the
faithful performance of all the covenants of this
Lease, and any assignment of the Lease as aforesaid shall not operate to release the
LESSEE
from any of its obligations hereunder." (emphasis added)
Therefore, when the District Court found that Husky
Oil Company of Delaware's assignee Trailer Mart, Inc.
breached the lease by operating a trailer and recreational vehicle sales outlet on the premises, the District
Court erred in not awarding judgment to the plaintiffs against Husky Oil Company of Delaware based
on its contractual liability, especially when Husky Oil
Company of Delaware did not plead waiver and estoppel as an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Clearly the District
Court erred in finding waiver and estoppel when it
was not pleaded; see Parowan Mercantile Co. vs. Gurr,
83 U. 463, 30 P.2d 207 (1934); Brittain vs. Gorman,
42 U. 586,133 P . 370 (1913).

POINT VII
T H E JENSEN
VS. OK
INVESTMENT
CORPORATION
CASE D I S T I N G U I S H E D .
Because the District Court confused this Court's
ruling in the Jensen vs. OK Investment Corporation
case, supra, with the issues in the present case, plaintiffs offer a brief outline of the main differences between the two cases:
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1) The Jensen case decided the issue as to when
a subtenant becomes a lessee in privity of contract with
the landlord to have standing to exercise a lease option.
The present case involves the issue of the capacity of
an executrix to exercise a lease option, and the issue
of forfeiture for breach of restrictive use covenants contained in a lease.
2) In the Jensen case, the original lessee OK Investment Corporation disclaimed all interest in the
lease in favor of its subtenant Trailer Mart, Inc. when
approached by the landlord for the delinquent rent.
This disclaimer produced a two party transaction wherein the subtenant and the lessor were able to negotiate
an extension of the lease directly. I n the present case,
not only did the original lessee Estate of Max Siegel
not disclaim all interest in the lease in favor of its subtenant Trailer Mart, Inc.; the Estate of Max Siegel
filed a counterclaim against the lessors for loss of the
lease. Therefore, without a disclaimer, a three party
transaction evolved, wherein the consent of the lessor,
lessee, and the subtenant were all needed before an
assignment could bind the parties, see Shell Oil Company vs. Stiffler, 87 U. 176, 48 P.2d 503, reh, den. 87
U. 197, 49 P.2d 1150 (1935). Since no evidence was
presented that the Estate of Max Siegel and George
and Emily Zeese consented to an assignment of the
lease to Trailer Mart, Inc., an assignment and extension of the lease could not arise by a subtenant's reliance upon a leasehold interest.
3) In the Jensen case, the subtenant Trailer Mart,
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Inc. sent a written offer including additional consideration to extend the lease at an increased rental. The
Jensens accepted this offer from their subtenant and
cashed the enclosed check for the delinquent rent and
nine subsequent checks at the increased rental before
objecting to their subtenant's inability to exercise the
lease option. In the present case, the subtenant Trailer
Mart, Inc. did not present a written claim to the lease
(Exhibit 12P) until after notice of termination had
been sent. Nor did Trailer Mart, Inc., the subtenant,
or the Estate of Max Siegel, the lessee, exercise the
lease option.
4) The Jensen case did not involve parties unable
to contract. The present case concerns an executrix
having limited powers to contract independent of the
Probate Court.
In summary, the Jensen case did not involve a
breach of a lease or the incapacity of a party to contract. The Jensen case decided solely the issue of
when a subtenant becomes a lessee in privity of contract with the lessor to have standing to exercise a lease
option.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs, George and Emily Zeese, submit that
the District Court erred in finding that Max Siegel
acted as agent for Trailer Mart, Inc. when he took the
assignment of the lease in question from Husky Oil
Company of Delaware,, Plaintiffs further submit that
the District Court erred in finding that Eva Siegel,
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Executrix named in the Last Will and Testament of
Max Siegel, exercised the option to extend the lease
on behalf of Trailer Mart, Inc. As the assignment,
Exhibit 6P, indicates, the lease was assigned to Max
Siegel as an individual. I t subsequently passed into
the hands of his legal representative, Eva Siegel as
Executrix of the Max Siegel Estate, upon his death.
Since the lease was not probated as personal property,
the lease lapsed and the defendants became month to
month tenants. Therefore, since the District Court's
findings are in error, the judgment must be reversed.
If the findings of Max Siegel's and Eva Siegel's
"agency" are not in error, the District Court erred in
precluding plaintiffs from enforcing the restrictive use
covenants contained in the lease by invoking the doctrine of waiver and estoppel—especially when the
parties agreed in the lease to remedy any breach of
the covenants within 30 day's notice, and that there
would be no waiver or forfeiture of the covenants by
acceptance of rent or otherwise. Nor did defendant
Husky Oil Company of Delaware even plead the affirmative defense of waiver and estoppel!
v'-This case is also one of first impression in Utah
and severely affects the tax collection procedures in the
State of Utah. For this Court to allow a person to
lease property and then to permit his successors and
heirs to bypass the Probate Court upon his death will
circumvent the statutory rules governing the descent
and distribution of personal property in Utah. Uncertainty will arise so that creditors will never know if
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they are dealing with an obligation of an estate or with
an obligation of parties to a secreted lease. Inequities
will also result, as in this instance, wherein an executrix acted as agent for a hidden lessee to prevent the
lessor from enforcing agreed upon restrictive covenants
governing the use of the property.
In consideration of the facts and the law presented
in the foregoing Argument, plaintiffs urge this Court
to reverse the judgment of the District Court and declare the lease void. Plaintiffs also request that the
counterclaims of the defendants be dismissed as a
matter of law, and that the case be remanded for a
determination of the damages suffered by plaintiffs.
Respectfully submitted,
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